Papers in metaphysics and epistemology

Cambridge University Press

1999

ix, 453 p.

Cambridge studies in philosophy

Introduction – New Work for a theory of universals – Putnam's paradox – Against structural universals – A comment on Armstrong and Forrest – Extrinsic properties – Defining 'intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) – Finkish dispositions – Noneism or Allism? – Many, but almost one – Casati and Varzi on holes (with Stephanie Lewis) – Rearrangement of particles: reply to Lowe – Armstrong on combinatorial possibility – A world of truthmakers? – Maudlin and modal mystery – Humean supervenience debugged – Psychophysical and theoretical identifications – What experience teaches – Reduction of mind – Should a materialist believe in Qualia? – Naming the colours – Percepts and color mosaics in visual experience – Individuation by acquaintance and by stipulation – Why conditionalize? – What puzzling Pierre does not believe – Elusive knowledge.

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This volume is devoted to Lewis's work in metaphysics and epistemology. Topics covered include properties, ontology, possibility, truthmaking, probability, the mind-body problem, vision, belief, and knowledge. The purpose of this collection, and the volumes that precede and follow it, is to disseminate more widely the work of an eminent and influential contemporary philosopher. The volume will serve as a useful work of reference for teachers and students of philosophy.

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