Derek Parfit's Reasons and persons

Routledge

2020

269 p.

Includes bibliographical references and index

9780429488450

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of contents -- Notes on contributors -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction to the Collection -- Notes -- References -- Part I -- 1 Toward a unified theory of morality: An introduction to Part One of Reasons and Persons -- Introduction -- The Self-interest Theory -- What the Self-interest Theory is -- How the Self-interest Theory is indirectly self-defeating -- The failure of several objections to the Self-interest Theory -- Practical dilemmas -- Consequentialism -- What consequentialism is How consequentialism is indirectly self-defeating -- The failure of several objections to Consequentialism -- Practical dilemmas -- Mistakes in moral mathematics -- Common-sense morality -- What common-sense morality is -- How Common-Sense Morality is directly self-defeating -- Revising Common-Sense Morality -- The unified theory of morality -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 2 Introduction to Part Two: Rationality and time -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Critical Present Aim Theory and intrinsically irrational desires -- 2.3 The 'best objection' to S -- 2.4 The appeal to full relativity -- 2.5 Time-bias 2.6 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 3 Introduction to Part Three: Personal identity -- 3.1 Criteria of personal identity -- 3.2 An objection to the psychological criterion -- 3.3 Is personal identity always determinate? -- 3.4 Divided minds -- 3.5 Personal identity does not matter -- 3.6 What matters when you divide? -- 3.7 Personal identity and rationality -- 3.8 Personal identity and morality -- Notes -- 4 Parfit, Population Ethics and Pareto Plus -- Introduction -- Plan for this chapter -- Why worry about Pareto plus? -- Does mere addition make things better? Does it make things worse? The Two Outcome Case. Consider the following case -- Pareto plus -- Mere Addition Principle (MAP) -- If a better chance of existence makes things better, does the actual fact of existence also make things better? -- Conclusions -- Appendix A -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 5 An Opinionated Guide to "What Makes Someone's Life go Best" -- Preferencehedonism and the Theory of Pleasure and Pain -- The Unrestricted DesireFulfillment Theory and the problem of remote desires -- preferences and counterfactual wellbeing -- Summative vs. Global DesireFulfillment Theories Objective vs. Subjective vs. Hybrid Theories -- Bibliography -- Part II -- 6 In a different league: Intransitivity, betterness, and league-based satisficing -- Introduction -- 6.1 Routes to the Repugnant Conclusion and Parfit's proposed evasion -- 6.2 An alternative way of evading the Repugnant Conclusion: The Continuum Argument for Intransitivity -- 6.3 The Intransitivity Thesis and league-based satisficing -- 6.4 Parfit's proposed evasion revisited -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- 7 Conativism about personal identity -- 7.1 Introduction

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